I read a remarkable stat about Paul Scholes's return:
"Scholes has completed almost 93% of his 813 passes that he has attempted in 12 league games, all but 3 % of which have come in the opposition half."
It's not the accuracy that amazes me - whenever someone brings up Barcelona's passing stats as they romp to victory I want to point out that for the last twenty minutes, at 4-0 up, they made 4oo 5-yard passes that an eight year old would complete 99.9% of the time - but where on the pitch Scholes makes his passes. If there is anything young players should take from the 37-year-old's game, it is how far forward he takes and passes on possession.
The return of Scholes has been called desperate and a master stroke. At first I was hesitant to pile on the plaudits because Manchester United are so strong and look to use the wings for their attacks so often that a central midfielder who simply shifts the ball sideways and on to the better players could easily be carried in most games (see Anderson, Carrick), but the fact Scholes is operating in his opponent's half shows he is contributing massively.
Leon Brittain and his Swansea team mates have been lauded for their passing style, and comments have been made about Brittain being in the top 5 for passing accuracy in Europe. But this is where statistics can be misleading - when you operate with a three man midfield, and pass from the back, you can rack up lots of short but meaningless and ineffective passes as you slowly move the opposition around. It can wear the opponent out but until you get into the final third it lacks any threat and can be very frustrating, leaving a team searching for a faster tempo.
To go back to United, Michael Carrick strikes me as someone who should look to replicate Scholes's game. It may be too late for the ex-West Ham and Tottenham midfielder, but whenever I watch him I get the feeling there is so much more to come, but the player himself is reluctant to put his mark on the game. You never hear the commentator say 'Carrick is dominating midfield'. Carrick makes too many square and backwards passes, doesn't look to create enough goal scoring opportunities, and even when he does play it simple he is a fraction slow, and attacks can stutter.
The fact Scholes has come in and done so well shows that Carrick has struggled to take up the mantle in the absence of Scholes.
It's not only United who have struggled with Scholes, England are another example of a team missing central midfielders who will command the ball in the opponent's half. Too often England moves involve the centre backs and central midfielders passing the ball in their own half, under no pressure from the opposition, before becoming desperate and pumping the ball forward.
Everyone knows about Paul Scholes and his ability on the ball, but where he picks the ball and how he passes it on, with pace, impetus and direction, is something the next generation of England playmakers would do well to copy.
Wednesday, 18 April 2012
Thursday, 12 April 2012
Agent Doherty: The Tactics files - Norwich
File Name: More Open than Jenny Thompson's Legs
Location: White Hart Lane
Date: April 9th
Opposition: Norwich
"Top of the evening to you, G-Doc back with another insight into Tottenham tactics. Bad times down at the Lane, and let's get to the first talking point. The captain, man of the moment, that oh-so-reliable centre back who defies injury to put in performance after performance slipped up badly over Easter, but enough about me, what about my old team mate Ledley King? The King, he is no more it seems.
In isolation it would seem my old mentee struggled, but if we delve deeper into matters on the pitch you'll find more than miles of tattoos and the smell of deep heat. Tottenham's problems, like most issues teams have, stem from the performance (or lack) of the midfield. Ready to go deeper still? Good, here we go....
Like an Ikea wardrobe built by a teenager, Tottenham's midfield did not hold together. The 4-4-2 - that formation closest to Harry's heart - has turned into an adulterous harlot, enticing the manager with its form and shape and simple beauty, only to turn out to be fucked by eleven men from Norfolk. There is nothing wrong with a 4-4-2 in principal as long as everyone works together. Partnerships can be forged between winger and full back, between the two strikers, central midfielders, centre backs etc, zonal marking makes up for the overloading of numbers in key areas, and attacking plans can be effected simply.
However, these partnerships have to work in defence as well as in attack. The centre forwards have to protect the central midfielders, who have to protect the centre backs; full backs should overlap or support wingers when going forward, and wingers should help the full back double up on the opposition's wide men. This did not happen.
Too many first balls were lost, but more critically too many second balls were lost. Norwich played a similar 4-4-2 which, judging by Harry's comments after the game (about his team's openness), the Spurs manager did not realise. Losing the second ball duel indicates a lack of determination and also a lack of team work, with team mates too far away from each other, allowing the opposition to close tightly on the ball and outnumber the Spurs men.
The midfield hardly covered themselves in glory. Gareth Bale had one of those games were he thought the world owed him a living, and if he played in League One he would have got a Gazza-boot up his arse I tell you! Tracking back seemed beneath him, and he managed to float in a tear in the space-time continuum most of the time. Rather than put his nose in where others put their feet, the Welsh Wizard was another guilty party, waiting for the ball to be won by others and then laid off to him. In the 4-3-3 of recent times that is more acceptable, in a 4-4-2 the wingers have to put in a shift. I really feel for Assou-Ekotto because he has too many 1-on-1s to deal with.
On the opposite flank Aaron Lennon was less culpable, but had one of those games were he was too wide. I don't mind stretching the pitch but when the ball is going down the opposite flank and an attack is being mounted you need to get involved. As a world class defender I can tell you there is nothing better than having a speedy winger stick to the opposite touchline.
When the attack broke down he was too far away to get back, and uninterested in helping out the central midfielders. Again, in a 4-3-3 that is okay, not in this system. In both cases the wingers should have been instructed to get narrow when the team is defending.
In the centre, Jake Livermore had a good game but he is not yet ready to be Parker's replacement, and it was strange to see Sandro sitting on the bench. I can only assume he was rested. Livermore failed to press Elliot Bennett for Norwich's second goal, but rather than blame the young man I would ask what would have happened if he was constantly dragged out of the middle? A hole you big enough to fit every tractor this side of Ipswich in, that's what.
Even with Parker in the middle, Spurs can be woefully open, and this was exacebated on Monday by the abysmal performance of Luka Modric. Outmuscled, outfought, outworked, the Croatian did little to help Livermore or the defence stem the flow of Green coming at them. Often he was caught jogging back ten to fifteen yards behind the play, and his lax attitude was symptomatic of too many Spurs players.
Changes at half time and 70 minutes improved Tottenham slightly, but the team could not defend and were lucky to only concede two. Redknapp bemoaned the openness of his time but any fool, even David Pleat, could have told you that such a loose team with no clear direction would struggle against an opposition who put up even half a fight. Tottenham's recent results have not matched their performances, and this game was int he same vain, except this time Spurs should have lost by more than one goal.
The manager has to take much of the blame but not for one moment should the players think they have avoided the heat. Redknapp should know better than most that formations and tactics are not the same thing, and while he might point out to the goalless draw at Stamford Bridge or the 3-1 win against Swansea, fact is the other results in the last month prove that it isn't the formation that's the problem, it's team shape, roles given to individual players, and most troubling of all the basic lack of effort put in by too many players.
Spurs face Chelsea on sunday and I would not be surprised if my old team go out there and do the business. A derby match, at Wembley, with the chance to get to a final? You bet the players will be up for that, which only goes to add to the insult of Monday's performance. You can have as easy run in as you like but if you don't match the effort of the opposition, you will not get anywhere.
I expect Redknapp to adopt the tactics he employed at the Bridge, and with good reason, but the top teams have more than just a Plan A. As I said before, when Redknapp puts some preparation in the natural skill of his team does the rest, but when he scribbles down a line up ten minutes before kick off his team will get exposed. People know they are vulnerable, fortunately they face a Chelsea team on sunday who have problems of their own.
Agent Doherty: The Tactics files - Swansea
File Name: Preparation ‘aitch
Location: White Hart Lane
Date: April 1st
Opposition: Swansea
“Alright geezers, you’re old mate Gaz ‘The Doc’ Doherty, aka the Ginger Pele, aka ‘ledge’...okay no one called me that last one but it doesn’t matter. I’m still ripping it up, this time for the mighty Wycombe Wanderers, but I had a thought about life after my playing career ends in another twelve years and decided that I should help all of you to understand the finer points of tactics at the top end of the modern game.
I’ve exploited all my contacts, used all my knowledge, and thanks to an online course in industrial espionage I found in the ads section of the Sun, got my diploma in spying. Using the carefully honed skills taught to be by my master, David Pleat, and the sunglasses and hat that came with the course, here is what I found...
As we all know, Spurs had been on a blip recently, but performances and more importantly results have picked up, and my sources tell me that it all started in the aftermath of the Stoke game a couple of weeks back. I’ve been sent pictures of Kevin Bond and Joe Jordan pulling out a chalk board from the back of the equipment cupboard, and men lining up in the penalty area, with one man stood on the corner flag. My antenna told me something was up, and I quickly recognised that they were practising set pieces. Harry had talked about a lack of ‘winners’ in the air (it’s alright Harry, I knew you were talking about yours truly. 35 career goals don’t lie) but that all changed. Since the Stoke game we have scored from two corners, and got on the end of several more. The signs were there at Stamford Bridge when Bale hit the crossbar.
Speaking of the Bridge, we saw Spurs employ a 4-3-3 system with Bale on the left and Van der Vaart on the right. The Dutchman isn’t the most mobile, but that didn’t stop me having a career that reached the highest highs and I doubt that will stop the ex-Real Madrid man either. He’s only 29, he’s got decades ahead of him.
Obviously Rafa isn’t a natural winger and not the greatest defensively, but Harry foresaw this problem, placing Sandro in a position on the right of the central three midfielders, with instructions to cover Rafa if the Dutchman went inside or forward, and to help Walker out defensively. This extra shield appeared to inspire Van der Vaart further, and his defensive contribution was much higher than normal. This laid the ground work for the Swansea game.
Against Bolton in midweek I noticed we set up in an almost identical way, the major change being Livermore in for Sandro, performing the same role. Van der Vaart looked a lot fitter, and the team created numerous chances – they just needed someone with a reputation for scoring goals to put the ball away. Unfortunately due to the terms of my loan I was not available, and anyway if Harry had called I would not have been able to answer as I had mistaken my mobile for an expired arctic roll and tried to eat it.
Swansea was the big game, and a big test. Harry has a habit of sticking to a winning formula once he has found it, and his laissez-faire style can sometimes see us under appreciate the obstacles and the qualities the opposition will bring. Swansea have a reputation for passing the ball a lot and there was a danger that while our new system had proved successful it would be undermined by not having the ball. If you don’t have the ball you can’t score, especially without the Ginger Pele in your team (although I make no guarantee which end it will go in) and I was interested to see how Harry would tailor our team to deal with the Taylors (see what I did there, damn I could have been the new Oscar Wilde. He was Irish too) Brittains, Sigurdson....Siggurdsson.....Sigsuriiidon...Sig....Allens and the rest of their ball players.
The answer was simple. He set Modric, Sandro and Parker to man mark their three counter parts in midfield, which often saw Modric as far forward as Adebayor, the full backs went tight on their wingers, and the team pressed as a group. They forced Swansea into errors and seized on them quickly. Harry had clearly done his homework, and it turned out to be A+.
There was yet another goal from a corner, although how someone as obvious as Adebayor can be unmarked six yards out is ludicrous. Would never have happened if I was in that defence. I would have thrown my head in there, broken my nose (yet again) and the blood gushing out of my nozzer would have put the striker. Experience, you see, something the Swansea boys lacked.
Then Harry tinkered, brought on Lennon, brought Rafa inside, and when the little man did finally get the ball he crossed for the third goal that finished the game off.
It was a good performance, full of energy, effort, and some good finishing. If we keep up the work, and Harry continues to identify and neutralise the opposition’s threats, as well as exploiting their weaknesses, we could end the season on a high. The players might even get a shiny medal. Won’t quite match my Norwich player of the season award in 2006, or my U18 European Championship winning medal in 1998 (seriously, look it up, I was a ledge even back then), but I’m sure the boys will be happy with them.
First up though is another tough game away to Sunderland, and another chance for Harry to show his tactical acumen. Sunderland’s dangerman, Stephane Sessengnon, likes to drift deep and wide, and it will be interesting to see whether Harry deploys a zonal or man marking system.
That about wraps up my first report, I’ve volunteered to wash the teams kit tonight, so see if you can spot me at the Lane next week and remember...you didn’t get any of this from me, right?”
Pressure on Dalglish after Comolli Resignation
"Once I made the choice who I wanted, Damien went away and did a fantastic job of bringing them in..."
With that statement Kenny Dalglish has accepted full responsibility for Liverpool Football Club, and most significantly the signings made during his tenure. Given their performances this season, that is a huge burden Dalglish has heaped on his own shoulders.
Damien Comolli is a mystery wrapped up in an enigma, covered in marmite. Some people love him for his forays into the European market, some hate him for the eye bulging amounts spent on distinctly average players, but apart from a handful of people at Arsenal, Tottenham and Liverpool, nobody knows what he actually did.
At Arsenal he was little more than their scout in France. At Spurs he claims credit for bringing in Gareth Bale, Aaron Lennon, and Luka Modric, but unsurprisingly makes no mention of the £15million David Bentley, the £16.5million Darren Bent, the £8.2million Didier Zokora or £13.5million Roman Pavlyuchenko. His record at Liverpool is equally inconsistent - Luis Suarez and Luis Enrique have been their stronger performers; Charlie Adam, Stewart Downing, Jordan Henderson and most notably Andy Carroll have failed to get anywhere near matching their transfer fees.
All in all, Comolli's year and a half at Liverpool provided Dalglish with the perfect cover, and nobody would have doubted him if the Scot excused the millions splashed out on Carroll et al by blaming Comolli. The 'Director of Football' is a misunderstood title in Britain and Comolli's record hardly shouts value for money. Comolli's departure could have strengthened Dalglish's hand when it comes to funds for the summer.
Of course, it could be argued that Dalglish is actually being very astute, for now, and in time his views will change. At this moment in time, slagging off Comolli would be to slag off the men above Dalglish - John W. Henry and Tom Werner. Comolli was their man, the embodiment of the Moneyball philosophy they wanted to import into football. Insult Comolli, insult Moneyball, insult Henry and Werner, and while Dalglish is an Anfield legend and has the league cup in the trophy room, results in the league and the fall out from the Suarez affair have left relations between board and manager a touch strained. Dalglish would not gain anything by challenging his employers.
With great power comes great responsibility and either through action or inaction over the summer Dalglish will be the sole person to be judged. Liverpool need to show a marked upturn in their performances and results, and if those multi-million pound Brits fail to prove value for money, Dalglish will have to face the music alone.
It's refreshing to see a manager to take responsibility, something which Dalglish has not always done this season, but it may turn out to be a very foolish move. Dalglish's decisions in the summer need to be spot on.
With that statement Kenny Dalglish has accepted full responsibility for Liverpool Football Club, and most significantly the signings made during his tenure. Given their performances this season, that is a huge burden Dalglish has heaped on his own shoulders.
Damien Comolli is a mystery wrapped up in an enigma, covered in marmite. Some people love him for his forays into the European market, some hate him for the eye bulging amounts spent on distinctly average players, but apart from a handful of people at Arsenal, Tottenham and Liverpool, nobody knows what he actually did.
At Arsenal he was little more than their scout in France. At Spurs he claims credit for bringing in Gareth Bale, Aaron Lennon, and Luka Modric, but unsurprisingly makes no mention of the £15million David Bentley, the £16.5million Darren Bent, the £8.2million Didier Zokora or £13.5million Roman Pavlyuchenko. His record at Liverpool is equally inconsistent - Luis Suarez and Luis Enrique have been their stronger performers; Charlie Adam, Stewart Downing, Jordan Henderson and most notably Andy Carroll have failed to get anywhere near matching their transfer fees.
All in all, Comolli's year and a half at Liverpool provided Dalglish with the perfect cover, and nobody would have doubted him if the Scot excused the millions splashed out on Carroll et al by blaming Comolli. The 'Director of Football' is a misunderstood title in Britain and Comolli's record hardly shouts value for money. Comolli's departure could have strengthened Dalglish's hand when it comes to funds for the summer.
Of course, it could be argued that Dalglish is actually being very astute, for now, and in time his views will change. At this moment in time, slagging off Comolli would be to slag off the men above Dalglish - John W. Henry and Tom Werner. Comolli was their man, the embodiment of the Moneyball philosophy they wanted to import into football. Insult Comolli, insult Moneyball, insult Henry and Werner, and while Dalglish is an Anfield legend and has the league cup in the trophy room, results in the league and the fall out from the Suarez affair have left relations between board and manager a touch strained. Dalglish would not gain anything by challenging his employers.
With great power comes great responsibility and either through action or inaction over the summer Dalglish will be the sole person to be judged. Liverpool need to show a marked upturn in their performances and results, and if those multi-million pound Brits fail to prove value for money, Dalglish will have to face the music alone.
It's refreshing to see a manager to take responsibility, something which Dalglish has not always done this season, but it may turn out to be a very foolish move. Dalglish's decisions in the summer need to be spot on.
Saturday, 10 March 2012
Goal Line Technology not the only ugly beast to raise its head
Football can be magnificent sometimes. Mere minutes after QPR had entered the dressing room at half time fuming with the injustice of a lineman wrongly deciding that Clint Hill's header had not cross the line, they then get the rub of the green over an offside decision that sees Djibril Cisse equalise against Bolton. In the blink of an eye the discussion moves from Goal Line Technology (GLT) to general refereeing incompetence, but if anything this only goes to show the complexities over GLT.
Fifa has taken its time to come round to the idea of GLT and it was only after the recent International FA board meeting (IFAB) that Fifa gave the green light for two systems, Hawk-Eye (well known to Cricket and Tennis fans) and GoalRef, to undergo further testing with a view to testing them in the 2013-14 season. The English Premier League has indicated they are more than ready to embrace GLT but in analysing the two systems it is easy to see why officials favour the GoalRef option.
Fifa has two main criteria when it comes to GLT. It should be quick - the delay between the ball crossing the line and the ref being notified should be around 1-2 seconds - and it should be 100% accurate. Accuracy is naturally important - there can be no margin for error as allowed under the Hawk-Eye cricket system. The last thing we want is managers pedantically arguing over a 3mm error margin, and a 100% system will stop all argument (one hopes).
The decision relay time is massively important. In today's game at the Reebok, Gary Neville commented that it only took him and his fellow commentator ten to fifteen seconds to see that the ball had crossed the line - less time than it took the pedantic linesmen to insure that the rules of football were followed and corner kicks were taking from the right place. This brings up a key issue of GLT and indeed any kind of technology that assists referee decision making - open play.
Referees and linesmen can take their time insisting the ball is spotted in the right place, that players are the full ten yards behind the ball, or confer with their fellow officials over whether a penalty or free kick was rightly awarded, because the play is dead. In a fast game like football, where the play can switch from one end to the other in a matter of seconds, referees are not afforded the luxury of time and have to make decisions instantly. If the ball, in their opinion, does not go across the line, the defending team can be up the other end and score a goal before people like Gary Neville have had a chance to decide whether the initial effort was a goal.
Also, consider this: what if the attacking team had their shot, it wasn't given, but they were still on the attack in the penalty box? Should the ref stop play, kill all momentum and end the attacking team's chance only to find that the ball did not cross the line? When does the action stop? What happens when it does? The game is too fluid in open play to stop and check decisions.
The Hawk-Eye system uses camera's mounted around the ground and an optical recognition system (i.e. a glorified spot the ball competition) to compute if the ball goes over the line. Two issues arise with a camera system, the first being that there can be so many obstacles in the penalty box that there is a danger that the cameras would not be able to detect a goal when one went in. What if a keeper smothers the ball and with his body obscuring the ball he pulls it back from over the line? Goal Line decisions are relatively rare in football and this scenario is obviously even rarer still, but if it is a possibility it only needs to happen once on the big stage for all confidence in the system to disappear.
The other issue with using cameras, one which makes it unfavoured by officials and thankfully is absent in the Hawk-Eye case, is human interpretation.
Officials fear that the use of cameras for GLT will be the first step on the road to fourth officials hunched over TV screens and managers watching video replays and throwing in protests and challenges. You only need to listen to the interviews after one weekend of football to hear two managers or sets of players disagree vehemently over a seemingly obvious decision, and it does not matter whether the human error is made on the pitch, next to the dugouts or in a TV truck, it will not eliminate even half the wrong decisions and only extend the number of people managers can vent their anger at.
A recent presentation to journalists by the Professional Game Match Officals Board revealed that linesmen get 99% of offside decisions right. On Sky's Sunday Supplement host Brian Woolnough commented how tough their job was after he and his fellow scribes were given a test of three offside decisions and Brian got all three wrong! Stopping to examine camera footage would slow down the game immensely, and if offsides and penalty calls are afforded trial by television, where would it end? We would have micro-management of games to an absurd scale.
So on to the GoalRef system, which uses a magnetic field and an electronic device inside the ballto detect when a goal has been scored. What effect the device could have on the physics of the ball is something that will be tested, as well as what impact the striking on the ball will have on the device. If GoalRef passes these tests then it would be my prefered choice - it doesn't rely on any human error, would not open the door to potential troubling advances by technology, and should give a result that no one could argue with (but no doubt some technophobes will blame whatever system comesinto play, anything to remove the burden from their shoulders).
If it were not for Clint Hill's 'goal' or Cisse's offside equaliser what would Neville, Wilkins and company have talked about? What would Mark Hughes say in his post match press conference? Incidents like these are what football is all about. A bit of good luck here, a bit of bad luck there, it all evens itself out and the big teams get all the big decisions. Football is fluid and it is live and it is exciting, and technology should only be embraced if it is instant and not up to conjecture. Let's not turn football into a mechanic, robotic sport, a game resorted to set pieces all day long. There is already a sport like that anyway - American Football.
Fifa has taken its time to come round to the idea of GLT and it was only after the recent International FA board meeting (IFAB) that Fifa gave the green light for two systems, Hawk-Eye (well known to Cricket and Tennis fans) and GoalRef, to undergo further testing with a view to testing them in the 2013-14 season. The English Premier League has indicated they are more than ready to embrace GLT but in analysing the two systems it is easy to see why officials favour the GoalRef option.
Fifa has two main criteria when it comes to GLT. It should be quick - the delay between the ball crossing the line and the ref being notified should be around 1-2 seconds - and it should be 100% accurate. Accuracy is naturally important - there can be no margin for error as allowed under the Hawk-Eye cricket system. The last thing we want is managers pedantically arguing over a 3mm error margin, and a 100% system will stop all argument (one hopes).
The decision relay time is massively important. In today's game at the Reebok, Gary Neville commented that it only took him and his fellow commentator ten to fifteen seconds to see that the ball had crossed the line - less time than it took the pedantic linesmen to insure that the rules of football were followed and corner kicks were taking from the right place. This brings up a key issue of GLT and indeed any kind of technology that assists referee decision making - open play.
Referees and linesmen can take their time insisting the ball is spotted in the right place, that players are the full ten yards behind the ball, or confer with their fellow officials over whether a penalty or free kick was rightly awarded, because the play is dead. In a fast game like football, where the play can switch from one end to the other in a matter of seconds, referees are not afforded the luxury of time and have to make decisions instantly. If the ball, in their opinion, does not go across the line, the defending team can be up the other end and score a goal before people like Gary Neville have had a chance to decide whether the initial effort was a goal.
Also, consider this: what if the attacking team had their shot, it wasn't given, but they were still on the attack in the penalty box? Should the ref stop play, kill all momentum and end the attacking team's chance only to find that the ball did not cross the line? When does the action stop? What happens when it does? The game is too fluid in open play to stop and check decisions.
The Hawk-Eye system uses camera's mounted around the ground and an optical recognition system (i.e. a glorified spot the ball competition) to compute if the ball goes over the line. Two issues arise with a camera system, the first being that there can be so many obstacles in the penalty box that there is a danger that the cameras would not be able to detect a goal when one went in. What if a keeper smothers the ball and with his body obscuring the ball he pulls it back from over the line? Goal Line decisions are relatively rare in football and this scenario is obviously even rarer still, but if it is a possibility it only needs to happen once on the big stage for all confidence in the system to disappear.
The other issue with using cameras, one which makes it unfavoured by officials and thankfully is absent in the Hawk-Eye case, is human interpretation.
Officials fear that the use of cameras for GLT will be the first step on the road to fourth officials hunched over TV screens and managers watching video replays and throwing in protests and challenges. You only need to listen to the interviews after one weekend of football to hear two managers or sets of players disagree vehemently over a seemingly obvious decision, and it does not matter whether the human error is made on the pitch, next to the dugouts or in a TV truck, it will not eliminate even half the wrong decisions and only extend the number of people managers can vent their anger at.
A recent presentation to journalists by the Professional Game Match Officals Board revealed that linesmen get 99% of offside decisions right. On Sky's Sunday Supplement host Brian Woolnough commented how tough their job was after he and his fellow scribes were given a test of three offside decisions and Brian got all three wrong! Stopping to examine camera footage would slow down the game immensely, and if offsides and penalty calls are afforded trial by television, where would it end? We would have micro-management of games to an absurd scale.
So on to the GoalRef system, which uses a magnetic field and an electronic device inside the ballto detect when a goal has been scored. What effect the device could have on the physics of the ball is something that will be tested, as well as what impact the striking on the ball will have on the device. If GoalRef passes these tests then it would be my prefered choice - it doesn't rely on any human error, would not open the door to potential troubling advances by technology, and should give a result that no one could argue with (but no doubt some technophobes will blame whatever system comesinto play, anything to remove the burden from their shoulders).
If it were not for Clint Hill's 'goal' or Cisse's offside equaliser what would Neville, Wilkins and company have talked about? What would Mark Hughes say in his post match press conference? Incidents like these are what football is all about. A bit of good luck here, a bit of bad luck there, it all evens itself out and the big teams get all the big decisions. Football is fluid and it is live and it is exciting, and technology should only be embraced if it is instant and not up to conjecture. Let's not turn football into a mechanic, robotic sport, a game resorted to set pieces all day long. There is already a sport like that anyway - American Football.
Wednesday, 15 February 2012
English Managers are best served staying at home.
Riposte to Football365...
Interesting read on football 365 this morning and I thought I would post a response, not in defence of English coaches but in explanation of what are unique circumstances that deter English coaches from plying their trade abroad.
Following on from my analysis on the lack of candidates, creditable or otherwise, for the England job, let's examine the reasons why English managers do not go abroad to build up the reputation and experience that Daniel Storey feels they need to be viable options for the big one, the sainted role of England manager.
Whether foreign experience is ideal for an England manager is another discussion, but the inherent strength of English club football makes it very difficult for English managers to escape their native land. A never-ending circle keeps them contained within domestic football.
Everyone knows about the bestest league in the world ever!! but the strength of English football is not an inverted, top heavy pyramid, with all the money and power dominated by those fortunately to be in the top league. Okay it is, but the Championship is a top 5 league in terms of attendance, as strong as many top leagues in Europe, and no second division anywhere in the world can match the old Division Two for prestige, quality, finance or support.
No one outside of Germany cares about the Second Bundesliga, no one outside of Italy cares about Serie B (unless they have stopped fixing matches), and the less said about the Segunda division in Spain the better. Teams struggle to get attendances that match League Two teams, while the Championship sells its television rights as far as Brazil!
What does this mean for managers? Working in the Championship will bring higher wages than a bottom half team in Serie A or Ligue 1, domestically it will bring more recognition and a bigger spotlight than mid table obscurity in Portugal or Belgium, and unless you have big success abroad you will not get into the Premiership - look how long it took Hodgson to have a crack in the Premier League despite success in Sweden and with the Swiss national team. Paul Lambert has achieved that with two successive promotions with Norwich.
Teams in the championship can challenge famous teams in Europe. Birmingham, with financial issues demanding their star players are sold off, finished only one point behind Braga, a top four team in Portugal, and Club Brugge. A fallen giant in the championship gives an English manager better career prospects than a gamble abroad.
Steve McClaren moved to Twente and won a league title in his first season. But did that impress back home? Sure, his reputation was in dire need of repair, but he could only find employment in the Championship when he decided to return home (and it will take a minor miracle for him to get another chance in England's top two divisions).
There is another question that needs to be asked: is England the anomaly? Other countries employ a majority of native managers but England was quicker to import players into its league. As such this made foreign managers more acceptable, and the likes of Roberto Martinez or even Roberto Mancini have played in England before managing. If more English players went abroad, would more managers naturally do the same?
With fewer top flight English managers, and foreign leagues only employing a small amount of foreign managers, its unlikely English managers could get a decent job abroad even if they wanted one. It's a vicious circle - more domestic jobs are given to foreigners, reducing the opportunities for English managers to show they have the skill to get a job abroad.
There might also be a kind of reverse-nepotism. If John Smith succeeded in Italy, then questions would ask why he did not succeed in England first. There would always be a fear he would struggle back in his homeland.
When you examine the people who have gone abroad - Hodgson, Richard Money, Peter Taylor, John Gregory, Tony Adams - all of them bar the current West Brom manager went to small clubs or nations in obscure lands on the outskirts of the footballing radar, and even then Hodgson was not a great success at Internazionale.
Ultimately the reason why English managers do not try their luck abroad is because they do not have the reputation on the continent to get a big job. Until English managers start winning big domestic and European titles, build up a reputation as a player (like David Platt at Sampdoria) or take advantage of an influx of English talent into a foreign league, their career prospects are better served fighting their way through the domestic scene, hoping for the chance to break into the big league.
Interesting read on football 365 this morning and I thought I would post a response, not in defence of English coaches but in explanation of what are unique circumstances that deter English coaches from plying their trade abroad.
Following on from my analysis on the lack of candidates, creditable or otherwise, for the England job, let's examine the reasons why English managers do not go abroad to build up the reputation and experience that Daniel Storey feels they need to be viable options for the big one, the sainted role of England manager.
Whether foreign experience is ideal for an England manager is another discussion, but the inherent strength of English club football makes it very difficult for English managers to escape their native land. A never-ending circle keeps them contained within domestic football.
Everyone knows about the bestest league in the world ever!! but the strength of English football is not an inverted, top heavy pyramid, with all the money and power dominated by those fortunately to be in the top league. Okay it is, but the Championship is a top 5 league in terms of attendance, as strong as many top leagues in Europe, and no second division anywhere in the world can match the old Division Two for prestige, quality, finance or support.
No one outside of Germany cares about the Second Bundesliga, no one outside of Italy cares about Serie B (unless they have stopped fixing matches), and the less said about the Segunda division in Spain the better. Teams struggle to get attendances that match League Two teams, while the Championship sells its television rights as far as Brazil!
What does this mean for managers? Working in the Championship will bring higher wages than a bottom half team in Serie A or Ligue 1, domestically it will bring more recognition and a bigger spotlight than mid table obscurity in Portugal or Belgium, and unless you have big success abroad you will not get into the Premiership - look how long it took Hodgson to have a crack in the Premier League despite success in Sweden and with the Swiss national team. Paul Lambert has achieved that with two successive promotions with Norwich.
Teams in the championship can challenge famous teams in Europe. Birmingham, with financial issues demanding their star players are sold off, finished only one point behind Braga, a top four team in Portugal, and Club Brugge. A fallen giant in the championship gives an English manager better career prospects than a gamble abroad.
Steve McClaren moved to Twente and won a league title in his first season. But did that impress back home? Sure, his reputation was in dire need of repair, but he could only find employment in the Championship when he decided to return home (and it will take a minor miracle for him to get another chance in England's top two divisions).
There is another question that needs to be asked: is England the anomaly? Other countries employ a majority of native managers but England was quicker to import players into its league. As such this made foreign managers more acceptable, and the likes of Roberto Martinez or even Roberto Mancini have played in England before managing. If more English players went abroad, would more managers naturally do the same?
With fewer top flight English managers, and foreign leagues only employing a small amount of foreign managers, its unlikely English managers could get a decent job abroad even if they wanted one. It's a vicious circle - more domestic jobs are given to foreigners, reducing the opportunities for English managers to show they have the skill to get a job abroad.
There might also be a kind of reverse-nepotism. If John Smith succeeded in Italy, then questions would ask why he did not succeed in England first. There would always be a fear he would struggle back in his homeland.
When you examine the people who have gone abroad - Hodgson, Richard Money, Peter Taylor, John Gregory, Tony Adams - all of them bar the current West Brom manager went to small clubs or nations in obscure lands on the outskirts of the footballing radar, and even then Hodgson was not a great success at Internazionale.
Ultimately the reason why English managers do not try their luck abroad is because they do not have the reputation on the continent to get a big job. Until English managers start winning big domestic and European titles, build up a reputation as a player (like David Platt at Sampdoria) or take advantage of an influx of English talent into a foreign league, their career prospects are better served fighting their way through the domestic scene, hoping for the chance to break into the big league.
Tuesday, 14 February 2012
Scrapheap for McCarthy
Deposed Wolves manager will find it hard to get back into management
Dear, dear Mick....just when I encouraged you to be more attacking and play two strikers upfront, you go all silly and chuck on three for the Black Country derby. What were you thinking?
The Yorkshireman crumbled under the pressure. After Kevin Doyle scored the winner against QPR last week McCarthy mistakenly thought that he had finally found the winning formula. Attack. Attack attack attack. The three striker system that overcame the West London club and secured a vital three points would be the system to overcame a well drilled West Brom side that was more successful on the road than back at their Hawthorns ground. As a theory, it contained some glaring holes.
Firstly, QPR were down to ten men. Wolves had actually started with their typical 4-5-1 formation and only injury and necessity saw that change. Wolves grabbed a goal straight after the restart, and even at 2-1 it could be said they did not have the game all their own way.
Against West Brom McCarthy's men were exposed from the first whistle. They only went in at half time level thanks to good goalkeeping from Wayne Hennessey and the killer instinct from Steven Fletcher, two players who are unlikely to leave the Premiership anytime soon even if Wolves do.
Once Jonas Olsson made it 3-1 Wolves were always liable to get hit on the counter, but McCarthy can have no complaints for his sacking. As stated in my piece six days ago McCarthy had spent money and accumulated a good squad that was understandably expected to perform better.
But where now for the former Republic of Ireland Manager? At 53 he could be said to be entering the prime of his managerial career but if he wants to get back on to the managerial rollercoaster he will have to step down a level. Steady building does not excite the mind like beating the odds against relegation, or the euphoria of taking a team (or teams) up to the Premiership. Wolves did not go up in a blaze of glory, they did not dazzle in the Premiership, and McCarthy's dour demeanour leaves a lasting impression for all the wrong reasons.
It's harsh to criticise a man who carried himself with a lot of dignity. Responsibility was accepted, bad luck was balanced with good, plaudits handed out to opponents when appropriate, and when the fans got on his back McCarthy allowed them their rights. There is much to admire but not much to find attractive about the ex-Sunderland boss.
That disastrous 2005-06 campaign sticks in the memory, when the Black Cats secured only 16 points in 28 games under McCarthy, as does the falling out with Roy Keane in the World Cup. McCarthy lacks the youthfulness, vigour, and perceived tactical knowledge that appears to be in vogue at the moment. It's easy to forget that he turned round a middling Wolves side that was failing to live up to expectations under Glenn Hoddle. However, that type of job, a job McCarthy would be best suited to, is likely to be offered to a younger man untainted by past failings and one has to wonder whether McCarthy wants another grinding job.
Management is a young man's game these days and a seasoned vet like McCarthy may find it hard to get his foot back in the door. After 20 years as a manager and 25 as a player, including 57 caps for the Republic of Ireland, McCarthy should enjoy some down time and hope his absence makes a chairman's heart grow fonder. Unfortunately for Mick, I don't think he will ever be remembered fondly enough.
Dear, dear Mick....just when I encouraged you to be more attacking and play two strikers upfront, you go all silly and chuck on three for the Black Country derby. What were you thinking?
The Yorkshireman crumbled under the pressure. After Kevin Doyle scored the winner against QPR last week McCarthy mistakenly thought that he had finally found the winning formula. Attack. Attack attack attack. The three striker system that overcame the West London club and secured a vital three points would be the system to overcame a well drilled West Brom side that was more successful on the road than back at their Hawthorns ground. As a theory, it contained some glaring holes.
Firstly, QPR were down to ten men. Wolves had actually started with their typical 4-5-1 formation and only injury and necessity saw that change. Wolves grabbed a goal straight after the restart, and even at 2-1 it could be said they did not have the game all their own way.
Against West Brom McCarthy's men were exposed from the first whistle. They only went in at half time level thanks to good goalkeeping from Wayne Hennessey and the killer instinct from Steven Fletcher, two players who are unlikely to leave the Premiership anytime soon even if Wolves do.
Once Jonas Olsson made it 3-1 Wolves were always liable to get hit on the counter, but McCarthy can have no complaints for his sacking. As stated in my piece six days ago McCarthy had spent money and accumulated a good squad that was understandably expected to perform better.
But where now for the former Republic of Ireland Manager? At 53 he could be said to be entering the prime of his managerial career but if he wants to get back on to the managerial rollercoaster he will have to step down a level. Steady building does not excite the mind like beating the odds against relegation, or the euphoria of taking a team (or teams) up to the Premiership. Wolves did not go up in a blaze of glory, they did not dazzle in the Premiership, and McCarthy's dour demeanour leaves a lasting impression for all the wrong reasons.
It's harsh to criticise a man who carried himself with a lot of dignity. Responsibility was accepted, bad luck was balanced with good, plaudits handed out to opponents when appropriate, and when the fans got on his back McCarthy allowed them their rights. There is much to admire but not much to find attractive about the ex-Sunderland boss.
That disastrous 2005-06 campaign sticks in the memory, when the Black Cats secured only 16 points in 28 games under McCarthy, as does the falling out with Roy Keane in the World Cup. McCarthy lacks the youthfulness, vigour, and perceived tactical knowledge that appears to be in vogue at the moment. It's easy to forget that he turned round a middling Wolves side that was failing to live up to expectations under Glenn Hoddle. However, that type of job, a job McCarthy would be best suited to, is likely to be offered to a younger man untainted by past failings and one has to wonder whether McCarthy wants another grinding job.
Management is a young man's game these days and a seasoned vet like McCarthy may find it hard to get his foot back in the door. After 20 years as a manager and 25 as a player, including 57 caps for the Republic of Ireland, McCarthy should enjoy some down time and hope his absence makes a chairman's heart grow fonder. Unfortunately for Mick, I don't think he will ever be remembered fondly enough.
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